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Abstract—We aim to determine whether a game-theoretic 
model between an insurer and a healthcare practice yields a 
predictive equilibrium that incentivizes either player to deviate 
from a fee-for-service to capitation payment system.  Using United 
States data from various primary care surveys, we find that non-
extreme equilibria (i.e., shares of patients, or shares of patient 
visits, seen under a fee-for-service payment system) can be derived 
from a Stackelberg game if insurers award a non-linear bonus to 
practices based on performance.  Overall, both insurers and 
practices can be incentivized to embrace capitation payments 
somewhat, but potentially at the expense of practice performance. 
Keywords—healthcare costs, game theory, proactive healthcare, 
health care capitation, fee-for-service 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Capitation and fee-for-service (FFS) payments are two 
contrasting systems to pay healthcare practices.  Under the 
capitation payment system, a fixed payment is made to the 
practice for each enrolled patient, per time period (the practice 
absorbs cost or surplus); under FFS payments, the practice is 
paid for each of the specific services delivered to a patient (the 
insurer absorbs cost or surplus).  Capitation payments are often 
theorized to be useful in shifting primary care toward proactive 
team and nonvisit care, which in turn may lead to lower 
hospitalization rates for patients due to the shift towards 
preventative care.  However, there is minimal literature 
demonstrating such objective findings, and little history of 
capitation payment enactment in the US [1]. 
 
The differences between potential care stemming from these 
two payment systems have led to vigorous debate within the US 
healthcare system; in particular, it is unclear whether FFS 
payments should be moved to capitation payments.  One reason 
for the reluctant shift toward capitation payments is the absence 
of proper incentive structures that adequately reward both the 
insurers and practices involved. Prior work, based on payment 
simulations, has shown that high levels of capitation payments 
would be necessary for a resulting change in primary care [2].   
The current economics literature has modeled insurer-practice 
networks through a competition and demand estimation lens, 
and shown that providers bear the most burden of a cost 
increase [3].  It has also shown that consumer welfare is 
negatively impacted by restricting choice of practice [4].  
However, the current literature lacks studies on the relationship 
between insurers and practices with regard to capitation and 
FFS payments.  Rather, prior work focuses on the effects of 
capitation and FFS payment systems on patients rather than a 
broader segment of the healthcare system.  
 
In contrast, we use a novel game-theoretic approach in 
setting the share of patients seen under capitation payments, 
which allows us to directly measure the potential shift from FFS 
to capitation payments as a result of insurer-practice 
competition.  Our work aims to fill the gap in the literature 
regarding the split between FFS and capitation payment system 
choice in the US, from both the insurer and practice 
perspectives.  We are motivated by the existence of patients 
who may gain higher utility from using either FFS or capitation 
payments; as such, it is worthwhile to explore whether the 
current system allows for the operation of both payment 
systems regardless of a specific patient’s preference.  We are 
able to determine that there is a functional system in which both 
FFS and capitation payment modes co-exist, while still 
incorporating quality of patient care in our holistic model. 
 
Specifically, we model the insurer as a party with the ability 
to set the fraction of patients f1 under an FFS payment system 
(as opposed to a capitation payment system).  In response, we 
model the practice as a party that can set the fraction of patient 
visits f2 conducted under an FFS model (i.e., visits without 
proactive team or nonvisit care).  This can be played as a 
Stackelberg game [5] wherein the first player, the insurer, sets 
the value of f1 so that the insurer’s net cost is minimized.  In 
response, the practice sets f2 so that the practice’s total revenue 
is maximized.  Further, we introduce a performance-based 
bonus mechanism [6] for insurers to either reward or penalize 
practices. 
 
In practice, fraction-setting of f1 and f2 can be done in 
several ways.  On one side, insurers create a suite of plans 
including both capitation and FFS payment methods, which can 
then induce desired shares of patients under each by altering 
prices effectively through offerings.  On the other side, instead 
of a market-based mechanism, practice managers adjust 
contracts at a regular time interval using historical knowledge 
of budget shortfalls and excesses.  From this framework, 
doctors can recommend more or fewer visits to FFS patients for 
checkups, which patients tend to follow per Say's Law [7].  
Hence, the timing of patient visits can be shifted by adjusting 
waiting times.  Further, capitation patients can be preferentially 
recommended virtual visits (via email, phone, etc. with nurse 
practitioners as opposed to doctors).  Our basic assumptions 
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include that practices do not turn patients away in order to 
maintain a certain capitation-to-FFS visit ratio, and that patients 
do not tend to switch between the payment systems at a 
meaningful level. 
II. METHODS 
A. Data 
We use historical data to realistically estimate the 
coefficients in each of the two relevant models: insurer net cost 
and practice revenue.  These US data are culled from several 
sources.  First, data on counts of patients and patient visits, 
capitation and FFS revenues, and doctor and nurse salary and 
benefit costs are found in the 2014 Medical Group Management 
Association (MGMA) data [2].  Second, an estimate of annual 
capitation patient visits is derived from prior work showing 1.2 
additional total visits per enrollee year for post-HMO (relative 
to pre-HMO) patients [8].  Third, hospitalization cost to 
insurers for FFS patients is the product of the number of days 
in an average hospital stay as of 2012 [9] and the per diem cost 
of an average FFS patient's hospital stay as of 2014 [1], i.e., 4.5 
times $2,212.  Fourth, the decrease in hospitalization cost when 
using a capitation payment system instead of FFS is derived 
from a 2011 study [10] finding a reduction of $7,679 per 1,000 
member months. 
 
All relevant variables (used to calculate f1 and f2 equilibria) 
are defined and listed with data estimates in Table 1.  
Henceforth, the term “capitation patient” refers to a patient 
under the capitation payment system who is expected to receive 
proactive team and nonvisit care during patient visits (whether 
in-person or virtual).  The term “FFS patient” refers to a patient 
under the FFS payment system who is expected to receive 
traditional doctor care.  All estimated values are for one year 
each. 
B. Modeling Insurer Net Cost 
In our model, the goal of the insurer is to minimize their net 
cost, comprised of five components: 
1. Annual FFS Cost: (f1 ´ p) ´ (f2 ´ nf) ´ rf denotes the 
number of FFS patients, multiplied by the number of 
FFS patient visits per FFS patients, multiplied by the 
FFS net cost per FFS patient visit. 
2. Annual Capitation Cost: [(1-f1) ´ p] ´ rc denotes the 
number of capitation patients, multiplied by the 
capitation net cost per patient. 
3. Annual Hospitalization Cost from FFS Patients: (f1 ´ 
p) ´ hf denotes the number of FFS patients multiplied 
by the hospitalization cost per FFS patient. 
4. Annual Hospitalization Cost from Capitation Patients: 
[(1-f1) ´ p] ´ hc denotes the number of capitation 
patients multiplied by the hospitalization cost per 
capitation patient. 
5. Performance-based Bonus (or Penalization): f(z,a,x) 
denotes the performance-based dollar amount paid by 
the insurer to the practice, where z is the practice’s 
performance metric (which is a function of f1 and f2), 
and a and x are parameters to be set by the insurer. 
TABLE I.  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND ESTIMATED ANNUAL VALUES 
Variable Description 
Annual 
Estimated 
Value 
f1 Fraction of FFS Patients (Insurer-set Parameter) 
f2 Fraction of FFS Patient Visits 
(Practice-
set 
Parameter) 
nf Number of Visits per FFS Patient [2] 2.24 
nc Number of Visits per Capitation Patient [2],[8] 3.44 
p Number of Patients per Practice [2] 1,684 
rf FFS Revenue per Patient Visit[2] $140.41 
rc Capitation Revenue per Patient [2] $346.32 
hf Hospitalization Cost to Insurers per FFS Patient [1],[9] $9,954.00 
hc Hospitalization Cost to Insurers per Capitation Patient [1],[9]-[10] $9,861.85 
he hf – hc $92.15 
cd Cost to Insurers for FFS Visit (Doctor) [2] $63.56 
cn Cost to Insurers for Capitation Visit (Nurse) [2] $24.04 
a Slope of Performance-Based Bonus (Insurer-set Parameter) 
x Cut-off Boundary of Performance-Based Bonus 
(Insurer-set 
Parameter) 
® ¥ 
z(f1,f2) Practice Performance Metric (Model-defined) 
f(z,a,x) Performance-Based Bonus (Paid by Insurer to Practice) 
(Model-
defined) 
 
The goal of setting a performance-based bonus function is 
to allow for insurers to incentivize practices to perform better 
services, so as to ameliorate the concern of capitation payment 
systems leading to lower quality of care.  We first define the 
nonlinear performance-based bonus function f(z,a,x) model 
formulation, and then identify two constraints in defining z, the 
practice’s performance metric.  Let f(z,a,x) be a piecewise 
function equaling: ax if z >  x , az if zÎ[-x,x], and -ax if z < -
x.  As such, the performance-based bonus will be a dollar 
multiplier a of the practice’s performance metric z within 
bounds defined by parameter x.  The existence of the x 
parameter [6] allows the insurer to protect themselves against 
extraordinarily large performance-based payouts. 
 
The first constraint on defining the practice’s performance 
metric z is to determine the spread of the function’s output.  
Prior work has shown that capitation patients correspond to a 
“reduction in ambulatory-care sensitive ED visits of 
approximately 0.7 per 1,000 member months or approximately 
22.6%” [10].  We assume symmetry, i.e. that FFS patients have 
a 22.6 percentage point increase in ambulatory-care sensitive 
ED visits relative to capitation patients.  Hence, we define the 
practice performance metric z(f1, f2) such that z(0,0) = 0.113 
and z(1,1) = -0.113, so that the difference between a fully FFS 
system and a fully capitation system is 22.6 percentage points 
as found in the prior literature. 
The second constraint on defining z is that it does not scale 
linearly in f1 or f2 in order to obtain non-extreme equilibrium 
values (i.e., neither insurer nor practice will set the share of FFS 
patients or FFS patient visits to exactly 0 or 1).  To this end, it 
is reasonable to envision a case where, with twice as many 
patient visits under FFS (presumably non-proactive) care, the 
quality of care diminishes more than twice as fast, due to 
physician burnout [11] and scaling factors for physicians 
working in teams [12].  Hence, we will assume a squared 
relationship in f2.  Further, it is generally assumed that patients 
under FFS tend to be healthier than those under capitation 
payments; so, it is also reasonable to assume that the quality of 
care diminishes less than twice as fast if we have double the 
share of patients treated under FFS.  Specifically, capitation 
patients are often on Medicare, and hence likely older and 
sicker, whereas FFS patients are typically employed [13].  As 
such, we assume a square-root relationship in f1. Combining, 
we define:  𝑧(𝑓$, 𝑓&) = 	−0.113	/𝑓$𝑓&& + 0.113(1 −/𝑓$	𝑓&&). 
 
Finally, we sum and simplify the convex minimization 
problem for the insurer to solve: min45 𝑓$𝑝7𝑓&𝑛4	𝑟4 − 𝑟: + ℎ<= + 𝜙(𝑧, 𝛼, 𝜉) 	𝑠. 𝑡. 0 ≤ 𝑓$, 𝑓& ≤ 1 
C. Modeling Practice Revenue 
In our model, the goal of the practice is to maximize their 
profit, comprised of five components: 
1. Annual FFS Revenue: (f1 ´ p) ´ (f2 ´ nf) ´ rf as defined 
in the insurer net cost model. 
2. Annual Capitation Revenue: [(1-f1) ´  p] ´  rc as defined 
in the insurer net cost model. 
3. Cost of Doctor from FFS Patients: (f1 ´ p) ´ (f2 ´ nf) ´ 
cd denotes the number of FFS patients, multiplied by 
the number of FFS patient visits per FFS patients, 
multiplied by the mean practice cost (i.e. doctor 
income) per FFS patient visit. 
4. Cost of Nurse from Capitation Patients: [(1-f1) ´ p] ´ 
[(1-f2) ´ nc] ´ cn denotes the number of capitation 
patients multiplied by the mean practice cost (i.e. 
nurse income) per capitation patient visit. 
5. Performance-based Bonus (or Penalization): f(z,a,x) 
as defined in the insurer net cost model. 
 
We sum and simplify the convex maximization problem for 
the practice to solve: 
 max	4F 𝑓&𝑝7𝑛4𝑓$7𝑟4 − 𝑐H= + 𝑛:𝑐I(1 − 𝑓$)= + 𝜙(𝑧, 𝛼, 𝜉) 	𝑠. 𝑡. 0 ≤ 𝑓$, 𝑓& ≤ 1 
D. Playing the Stackelberg Game 
In an economic Stackelberg game, two players (a leader and 
a follower) take turns competing on quantity.  In our analogous 
setting, the insurer and healthcare provider take turns 
effectively setting quantities (the number of patients under FFS, 
and the number of patient visits under FFS, respectively).  In 
this paper, we assume only one insurer and one practice play 
the Stackelberg game; it is non-trivial to expand to multiple 
players in this framework.  In one round of playing, the insurer 
plays first by setting f1, and the practice responds by setting f2, 
thus concluding the game.  In a multiple-round game (also 
referred to as a “repeated game”), the insurer will solve the 
current round’s minimization problem using the previous 
round’s value of f2 set by the practice, and likewise for the 
practice with the previous value of f1.  When multiple rounds 
are played, the insurer determines all actions (i.e., the values of 
f1 to set) prior to the start of the Stackelberg game; similarly, 
the practice determines their actions over all rounds of the game 
in response to the insurer’s actions.  
 
The game is solved using basic backwards induction.  Let 
the insurer’s minimization expression derived above be defined 
as 𝑚𝑖𝑛45 𝑃(𝑓$, 𝑓&) and the practice’s maximization expression be 𝑚𝑎𝑥4F Π(𝑓$, 𝑓&).  Since the insurer moves first by setting f1, we 
define the best response for the practice as 𝑅(𝑓$) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥4F Π(𝑓$, 𝑓&).  Given that the insurer can calculate 
how the practice will react, the best response for the insurer will 
be to play 𝑓$ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛45 P(𝑓$, 𝑅(𝑓$)). 
 
Using this method, we perform case analysis on the two 
types of solutions resulting from our choice of x: when zÏ[-
x,x], and when zÎ[-x,x].  We summarize results for a one-round 
game, which are also applicable to multiple rounds if we can 
ensure that the value of f2 given the previous f1 value will be 
either zÎ[-x,x] for all rounds, or zÏ[-x,x] for all rounds. 
 
When zÏ[-x,x], the practice will solve a linear optimization 
problem since f(z,a, x) is defined entirely by constants a and x 
(and not z).  Using the constant variables defined in Table 1, the 
insurer knows that the practice will choose f2 to maximize 𝑓&𝑝7𝑛4𝑓$7𝑟4 − 𝑐H= + 𝑛:𝑐I(1 − 𝑓$)=,  yielding an equilibrium of f2 
= 1 since all other coefficient multipliers are known to be 
positive.  In response, the insurer tries to minimize	𝑓$𝑝7𝑓&𝑛4	𝑟4 −𝑟: + ℎ<=.  Now, substituting for the relevant expected values 
yields a positive coefficient on f1, which necessitates that the 
insurer will set f1 to 0.  This pairing of equilibrium settings is 
non-optimal, as there is no incentive for health practices to take 
any patient visits under a capitation payment system, even when 
insurers have entirely capitation patients.  As a counterexample, 
with f2 = 0.8, the insurer’s incentive flips so that f1 = 1 and both 
players are better off.  However, even this case is not conducive 
to incentivizing any patients to be under the capitation payment 
system.  We note that if our value of he were less than $31.80 
(i.e., if there were a lower difference between hospitalization 
costs for FFS and capitation patients), then the equilibrium 
would be found at f1 = f2 = 1, and neither insurers nor practices 
would be incentivized to promote capitation payment systems. 
 
In the case where zÎ[-x,x] (or if we simply assume that x 
goes to infinity in our model), we solve both the insurer net cost 
minimization and the practice revenue maximization using  𝜙(𝑧, 𝛼, 𝜉) = 	𝛼(0.113 − 0.226	/𝑓$𝑓&&).  This results in the practice 
setting 𝑓& = [𝑝/(0.452𝛼)] 	 ⋅ 	 (/𝑓$(𝑛4(𝑟4 − 𝑐H) − 𝑛:𝑐I) + 𝑛:𝑐I//𝑓$	) .  In this case, it is possible to find non-extreme (i.e., 
neither 0 nor 1) settings of f1 and f2 due to the nonlinearity of 
the performance-based bonus function f(z,a,x); these equilibria 
are more realistic to expect. 
 
III. RESULTS 
To focus on the more interesting non-linear case where zÎ[-
x,x], we let x go to infinity.  We can numerically find the 
equilibria for any given number of rounds of the Stackelberg 
game, since our alternating minimizing (insurer net cost) and 
maximizing (practice revenue) functions are both convex.  Our 
model is able to find Stackelberg equilibria such that both 
insurers and practices will set non-extreme values for the share 
of FFS patients and FFS patient visits (hence indicating some 
incentive of switching to capitation payments).  However, these 
equilibria yield a negative practice performance as defined by 
z(f1, f2). 
 
An example of a reasonable insurer choice is setting a = 
682,000 in a game played with any known number of 
alternating rounds.  For only one round, we have f1 = 0.9536 
and f2 = 0.9397; for 100 rounds, we have a very similar f1 = 
0.9527 and f2 = 0.9398.  Both settings of rounds result in a 
performance-based penalty for practices, which would 
incentivize the use of capitation payments; for one round, the 
insurer would earn an additional −𝜙 =	−𝛼 ⋅ 𝑧 = 	−682,000 ⋅70.113 − 0.226 ⋅ √0.9536 ⋅ 0.9397&= = $55,843.00  for that year 
from that practice.  Similarly, for 100 rounds, the insurer would 
earn an additional $55,808.54 annually.   
 
Results are plotted in Fig 1 based on a game with one round 
and a game with 100 rounds (which appear representative of 
any number of rounds, both even and odd).  The non-extreme 
ranges for f1 and f2 are intuitive since the insurer aims to 
minimize the performance-based bonus value (along with the 
original net cost), so it is reasonable that the a values chosen 
will be near the minimum of the performance-based bonus 
function plotted in red.  Note that, based on this model, an 
equilibrium wherein both f1 and f2 are not set to extreme values 
necessarily results in a performance-based penalty as opposed 
to a bonus.  One interpretation of this phenomenon is that in 
order to incentivize non-extreme settings of FFS versus 
capitation payments, practice performance would be sacrificed. 
 
We comment that these results are robust to including 
revenue inflation in the model, which is currently used as an 
incentive for practices to convert to capitation payments over 
FFS.  However, since capitation revenue and FFS revenue 
would likely be inflated year-over-year at a similar rate, we did 
not find strongly observable effects in causing higher shares of 
capitation patients or patient visits.   
IV. DISCUSSION 
Our model formulation finds equilibria wherein both 
insurers and practices are incentivized to embrace the capitation 
system to some degree; however, these equilibria may not be 
the best option available to the involved patients.  Our results 
 
Fig. 1. (A) Top: Practice performance-based bonus/penalty parameter a, set 
by the insurer, is shown against corresponding f1 and f2 values (black and blue 
lines, respectively) on the left axis, and resulting practice performance-based 
bonus on the right axis (red line), after playing one round of the Stackelberg 
game.  There are no equilibria where neither f1 nor f2 have extreme values while 
also yielding a positive performance-based bonus. (B) Bottom: Similar results 
are shown after playing 100 rounds of the Stackelberg game. 
are directly interpretable regarding the choice of capitation 
versus FFS patient and patient visit shares to be set by the 
involved parties in a Stackelberg game.  This is the first model 
showing that, theoretically, both insurers and practices can have 
some degree of flexibility in setting usage of both FFS and 
capitation payment systems simultaneously.  Further, finding 
the ensuing non-extreme equilibria between  FFS and capitation 
payment systems implies that it is possible for both payment 
systems to co-exist within the current healthcare ecosystem, 
allowing for diversity of patient choice (though potentially at 
the expense of quality of patient care).  These findings may be 
of use in future policy-based discussions on the benefits of 
shifting from FFS to capitation payments, and in particular 
show that it is possible for an insurer and practice to attempt a 
transitory phase having both payment systems in place. 
 
The fact that non-extreme equilibria result from our 
Stackelberg game is due to our introduction of a non-linear 
 
 
performance-based bonus function; this takes into account that 
practice performance may decrease superlinearly when 
confronted with more FFS patient visits, and sublinearly when 
confronted with more (presumably healthier) FFS patients.  
With either a linear, or nonexistent, performance-based bonus 
function, both the alternating minimization and maximization 
functions for insurers and practices would be linear in their 
respective f1, f2 values, and would result in extreme solutions of 
either 0 or 1 for each setting of FFS patient shares and FFS 
patient visit shares.  Instead, we have built a more realistic 
model wherein both payment systems can be implemented by 
insurers and practices. 
 
We have hence shown that a reasonable payment 
mechanism can occur when the insurer sets the performance-
based bonus using variable a to minimize their own net cost in 
the game, though this occurs at the expense of overall practice 
performance.  Future work involves extending the model to 
multiple insurers and practices (similar to the Burdett-Shi-
Wright model) and incorporating the direct relationships 
between each practice and individual insurers.  Further, it could 
be useful to research patient behavior with regard to utility 
derived from FFS versus capitation payment systems; this line 
of work could allow for estimating the magnitude of second-
order effects, such as insurer revenue, if incorporated in our 
Stackelberg game.  
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